A great day for equality in the United States. The Court made our Union, more perfect. 

The case was OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 

The case was decided 5-4 with Kennedy writing the majority opinion. Roberts dissented. All four dissenting justices wrote opinions. Scalia came back with a particularly scathing dissent. 

You can read the whole opinion, (it's really long) here

I'll try and put up some of the dissenting opinions later but here is Kennedy's opinion, in short form:

Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage
between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully
licensed and performed out-of-State. Pp. 3–28.

(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is
appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court.
Pp. 3–10.

(1) The history of marriage as a union between two persons of
the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases. To the respondents,
it would demean a timeless institution if marriage were extended
to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far from seeking to devalue
marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect—and
need—for its privileges and responsibilities, as illustrated by the pe-titioners’ own experiences. Pp. 3–6.

(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change.
Changes, such as the decline of arranged marriages and the abandonment
of the law of coverture, have worked deep transformations
in the structure of marriage, affecting aspects of marriage once
viewed as essential. These new insights have strengthened, not
weakened, the institution. Changed understandings of marriage are
characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become
apparent to new generations.

This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay and
lesbian rights. Well into the 20th century, many States condemned
same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as an
illness. Later in the century, cultural and political developments allowed
same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives. Extensive
public and private dialogue followed, along with shifts in public attitudes.
Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon
reached the courts, where they could be discussed in the formal discourse
of the law. In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, which upheld a Georgia law that
criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws making samesex
intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 575. In 2012, the federal Defense
of Marriage Act was also struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570
U. S. ___. Numerous same-sex marriage cases reaching the federal
courts and state supreme courts have added to the dialogue. Pp. 6–
10.

(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex. Pp. 10–27.

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479,
484–486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests
of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them
its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry
but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is
protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U. S. 1, 12, invalidated bans on interracial unions, and Turner v.
Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95, held that prisoners could not be denied the
right to marry. To be sure, these cases presumed a relationship in-volving opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a
one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal
question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed
broader principles. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing
whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples,
the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry
has been long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454.
This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise
the right to marry. Pp. 10–12.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court’s relevant
precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage
is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding
connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated
interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388
U. S., at 12. Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate
that an individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is
true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.
A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to
marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike
any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate
association protected by this right was central to Griswold v.
Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married
couples to use contraception, 381 U. S., at 485, and was acknowledged
in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex couples have the same right
as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extending
beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a
criminal offense. See Lawrence, supra, at 567.
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a
more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue
thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See
Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that the right to marry is
less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. Precedent
protects the right of a married couple not to procreate, so the
right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment
to procreate. 

Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear
that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. See
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211. States have contributed to the
fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of
many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between
same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle,
yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability
many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to
lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society,
for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning
of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Pp. 12–18.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive,
yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of
the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court invoked
both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause;
and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, where the Court invalidated
a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from
marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal understandings
can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institutions
that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has
invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sexbased
inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450
U. S. 455, 460–461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and
equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120–121.
The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional
safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays
and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic also
applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty
of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality.
The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples
are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from
exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of
disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing
harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.
Pp. 18–22.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the
liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protec-tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples
may exercise the fundamental right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is
overruled. The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these cases
are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from
civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.
Pp. 22–23.

(5) There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation,
litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates, and
grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive litigation
in state and federal courts have led to an enhanced understanding
of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy
is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are
harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental
right. Bowers, in effect, upheld state action that denied gays
and lesbians a fundamental right. Though it was eventually repudiated,
men and women suffered pain and humiliation in the interim,
and the effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers
was overruled. A ruling against same-sex couples would have the
same effect and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the issue they
present to the Court, which has a duty to address these claims and
answer these questions. Respondents’ argument that allowing samesex
couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution rests on a
counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples’ decisions about marriage
and parenthood. Finally, the First Amendment ensures that
religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling
and so central to their lives and faiths. Pp. 23–27.

(c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize samesex
marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-sex couples
may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there
is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex
marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex
character. Pp. 27–28.

772 F. 3d 388, reversed.

Last edited by TheLagerLad (6/26/2015 9:42 am)